Partial Face Detection and Illumination Estimation by Sarkar, Sayantan
ABSTRACT
Title of thesis: PARTIAL FACE DETECTION
AND ILLUMINATION ESTIMATION
Sayantan Sarkar
Master of Science, 2018
Thesis directed by: Professor Rama Chellappa
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Face Analysis has long been a crucial component of many security applications.
In this work, we shall propose and explore some face analysis algorithms which are
applicable to two different security problems, namely Active Authentication and
Image Tampering Detection. In the first section, we propose two algorithms, “Deep
Feature based Face Detection for Mobile Devices” and “DeepSegFace” that are
useful in detecting partial faces such as those seem in typical Active Authentication
scenarios. In the second section, we propose an algorithm to detect discrepancies
in illumination conditions given two face images, and use that as an indication to
decide if an image has been tampered by transplanting faces. We also extend the
illumination detection algorithm by proposing an adversarial data augmentation
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Face detection and analysis is a well studied problem in recent Computer
Vision research. Advances in Deep Learning techniques have enabled leaps in per-
formance in both low and high level vision tasks relating to facial analysis such
as
• Low level tasks: Face Detection, Pose and Fiducial Detection and Facial At-
tribute Detection
• High level tasks: Face Recognition and Face Verification
Face analysis is often a crucial part of many security applications such as Active
Authentication (AA) and image tampering detection. In this work, we focus on the
problem of detecting partial faces in AA scenarios, finding illumination conditions
of a facial image and leveraging that information to detect if an image has been
possibly forged.
1.1 Partial Single Face Detection for Active Authentication
The first step in the facial analysis pipeline is Face Detection. Due to the
release of many public, large-scale face datasets [2] [3] [4], many state-of-the-art
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face detectors [5] [6] [7] have been proposed and developed, which approach human
performance in detecting faces even in cluttered environments. However, consider
the domain of Active Authentication (AA), where one is interested in developing
algorithms that continuously verify if the correct user is using a mobile device.
Verification of users using their front camera captures is significant part of many
proposed AA systems. Detecting faces from front cameras captures comes with a
unique set of challenges and advantages, compared to detecting faces in a general
setting. Some of the challenges of detecting faces in the AA setting are:
• Partial Visibility: In many cases, the user’s face captured by the front camera
is only partially visible.
• Running on phone GPU: The face detector should be light-weight enough to
run on a phone’s GPU.
However, there are some mitigating circumstances that make the task simpler, such
as:
• Single Face: Since mobile devices are used by single users at a time, there is
only one face to be detected. Also users are present close to the phone, hence
we can assume a fairly large face is to be detected.
• Pose: When users interact with mobile devices, usually frontal images are
captured. Extreme pose variations are rare.
Thus, in this work, we focus on developing face detectors that take the above men-
tioned factors into consideration, to perform well in the task of detecting single, but
2
partially visible faces.
1.2 Tampering Detection using Face Illumination Discrepancies
Image tampering detection is an area where facial analysis has recently gained
traction. Consider the case where a face has been digitally doctored into an image.
The transplanted face image is under a certain lighting condition, depending on the
illumination of the image it is originally from. There is a significant chance that
the image it is being pasted into has a different illumination condition. Thus, if we
check the illumination conditions of faces in a given image and find discrepancies,
it is indicative that one of the faces has been transplanted.
In this work, we explore a method of identifying the illumination conditions of
a 2D face crop, and then extend that into a verification framework that is trained
to directly predict if two faces have the same illumination condition.
3
Chapter 2: Related Work
In this chapter, we shall review some of the relevant related works in the fields
of Active Authentication and Face Detection and the datasets used in the various
methods described later.
2.1 Active Authentication Datasets
Active Authentication (AA) is an active field of research. Many methods have
been proposed based on different individual modalities and their fusion such as:
• Facial images [8] [9]
• Touch/swipe signature [10]
• Gait recognition [11]
• Device movement and accelerometer patterns [12] [13]
• Multi-modal fusion [14]
In this work, we focus mostly on face detection for AA. While there are many
large-scale face detection datasets, they are not suited for face detection in the AA
setting. The main characteristics of an ideal AA face detection dataset are:
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• Device: The image should have been captured by mobile device or a webcam.
• User awareness: While the user is informed of the data collection process
beforehand, it must be ensured that during the process itself, the user is not
made conscious that he or she is being recorded and should be left free to
perform actions naturally.
• Dataset size: The dataset should be large and varied enough to be able to
train complex machine learning models.
• Usability: The dataset should be annotated and available publicly.
A few relevant AA datasets are described below:
2.1.1 MOBIO: Constrained mobile dataset
The MOBIO dataset [15] contains 61 hours of audio-visual data from a NOKIA
N93i phone (and a 2008 Mac-book laptop) with 12 distinct sessions of 150 partici-
pants spread over several weeks. However, it is a constrained dataset, where subjects
were required to position their head inside an elliptical region within the scene while
capturing the data. Therefore it does not represent real-life acquisition scenarios.
2.1.2 Abacus and Move: Private datasets
Google’s Project Abacus dataset is a 27.62 TB collection of smartphone us-
age data of 1500 users for six months on Nexus5 phones [16]. It contains multi-
ple modalities, such as front-facing camera, touchscreen and keyboard, gyroscope,
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accelerometer, magnetometer, ambient light sensor, GPS, Bluetooth, WiFi, cell an-
tennae, app usage and on time statistics. Google also collected the 114GB Project
Move dataset, which consists of smartphone inertial signals collected from 80 volun-
teers over two months on LG3, Nexus5, and Nexus6 phones. While these datasets
are unconstrained, they are not available publicly for the research community.
2.1.3 AA-01 and UMDAA-02: Publicly available unconstrained mo-
bile datasets
The AA-01 dataset [14] is a challenging dataset for front-camera face detection
task which contains the front-facing camera face videos and swipe information for 43
male and 7 female IPhone users under three different ambient lighting conditions.
A subset of this dataset, AA-01-FD, contains 8036 frames annotated with a face
bounding box. AA-01-FD, contains 1607 frames without faces and 6429 frames with
faces [1], [17]. The training split consists of 5202 images, while the rest are used as
test images. The images in this are semi-constrained as the subjects perform a set
task during the data collection period. However they are not required or encouraged
to maintain a certain posture, hence the dataset is sufficiently challenging due to
pose variations, occlusions and partial faces.
The UMDAA-02 dataset is an unconstrained dataset containing 141.14 GB of
smartphone usage collected from 48 subjects using Nexus 5 phones over a 2 month
period. All modalities described in Google’s Abacus dataset are collected. A subset




In this section we shall briefly review different face detection methods by cat-
egorizing them under 3 subsections.
2.2.1 Traditional methods
Face detection is one of the earliest applications of computer vision dating back
several decades [18] [19]. However, most methods before 2004 performed poorly in
unconstrained conditions, and therefore were not applicable in real-world settings
[20]. Viola and Jones’s seminal work on boosted cascaded classification-based face
detection [21] was the first algorithm that made face detection feasible in real-world
applications. The method, however, works reasonably well only for well illuminated,
near-frontal faces without occlusion [22]. Extensions of the boosted architecture for
multi-view face detection were proposed [23] [24], but these detectors are difficult
to train, and do not perform well because of inaccuracies introduced by viewpoint
estimation and quantization [22].
The next step in the evolution of face detectors was the introduction of geo-
metric modeling. Using facial components or parts to construct a deformable part
model (DPM) of a face, a robust face detector was proposed in [5]. Similar ap-
proaches are found in [25] [26]. In [27], the authors introduced an examplar-based
face detection method that does not require multi-scale shifting windows.
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A popular face detection paradigm was using some combination of a robust
image features like SURF, local binary pattern (LFP) histogram of oriented gradient
(HoG) or their variants, along with a classifier, especially support vector machines
(SVMs), in a sliding window fashion. Researchers proposed different combinations
of features with SVM for robust face detection as surveyed in [20].
Some noteworthy, high performance traditional, non-deep methods are dis-
cussed below. In [28] the authors improved the performance of the DPM-based
method and also introduced Headhunter, a new face detector that uses Integral
Channel Features (ICF) with boosting to achieve state-of-the-art performance in
face detection in the wild. A fast face detector that uses the scale invariant and
bounded Normalized Pixel Difference (NPD) features is proposed in [29] that uses a
single soft-cascade classifier to handle unconstrained face detection. The method is
claimed to achieve state-of-the-arts performance on FDDB, GENKI, and CMU-MIT
datasets.
2.2.2 Deep learning-based methods
The performance break-through observed after the introduction of Deep Con-
volutional Neural Networks (DCNN) can be attributed to the availability of large
labeled datasets, availability of GPUs, the hierarchical nature of the deep networks
and regularization techniques such as dropout and batch normalization [20].
Some of the earliest methods that introduced deep features to the space of face
detection relied on transfer learning. Instead of training a full deep network, [30] used
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features from alexnet [31] and then trained SVM on those deep features to detect
faces. Full, end-to-end trainable deep networks for face detection appeared in [32]
[33]. Since then there have been a proliferation of deep learning based algorithms
for face detection.
Among recent works, HyperFace [7] and All-in-one network [6] are a deep
multi-task learning framework that perform face detection, landmark localization,
pose Estimation, and gender recognition among other tasks. These methods exploits
the synergy among related tasks by fusing the intermediate layers of a deep CNN
using a separate CNN and thereby boosting their individual performances.
2.2.3 Methods tailored for active authentication
Continuous authentication of mobile devices requires partially visible face de-
tection and verification to operate reliably [34]. In [1], the authors introduced a
face detection method based on facial segments to detect partial faces on images
captured for AA with smartphones. The algorithm first produces face proposals
by employing a number of weak Adaboost facial segment detectors on each image
and then clustering them. After filtering out overlapping proposals and then form-
ing subsets of facial segments from each cluster, statistical features from the face
proposals were used to train a support vector machine classifier for face detection.
The method worked well on AA-01-FD [14] and UMDAA-02-FD [34] mobile face
detection datasets compared to other non-CNN methods [34].
Among deep learning methods that consider face parts, [35] achieves state-
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of-the-arts performance on the FDDB, PASCAL and AFW datasets by learning
to identify parts of the face such as hair, eyes, nose, mouth and beard and then
combining those proposals into a face detection.
2.3 Illumination and tampering
Detecting tampering in images usually rely on low level features, such as de-
tecting discrepancies in statistical features of global and local image noise [36]. An-
other possible indicator is double JPEG compression artifacts that was explored
in [37]. Steganalysis feature-based methods [38] [39] have also been used to extract
low level information to detect tampering. However, these methods rely on low level
features of the image signal, rather than on higher level understanding of the scene.
Some algorithms like [40], rely on higher level image understanding since they
seek to detect inconsistencies in illumination and shadows. However, this method is
not automatic and requires user interaction.
Deep learning-based methods like [41] have recently been proposed for this
problem. In [41], the authors propose a two stream network, where the first stream
is used to detect if a face is tampered or not, while the second stream is used to
classify each patch of the image as real or fake. The results are combined to produce
the final decision.
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Chapter 3: Deep Feature based Face Detection for Mobile Devices
Face Detection from mobile front camera captures, which are of importance in
domains like Active Authentication (AA), is the primary focus of this section. As
mentioned in 1.1, this problem has its own set of challenges and advantages. It is
an important problem, because reliable face detection is a necessary condition for
further processing like face recognition and authentication.
3.1 Challenges and Advantages
• Partial Visibility: When user’s use a mobile phone, they might not be directly
looking into it. As shown in Fig. 3.7, there are many cases, when only a
partial face is visible.
• Running on phone GPU: While modern mobile devices usually have a GPU,
they are not usually Nvidia GPUs. Hence usual CUDA based frameworks like
Caffe cannot run on mobile phones. However, OpenCL is an open standard
that runs on both Nvidia and non-Nvidia GPUs. For Android phones Render-
Script is another alternative for programming GPUs. Thus for the algorithm
to run on a mobile platform, it must be reasonably less computationally in-
tensive and be implementable using OpenCL or RenderScript.
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Some of the inherent advantages in the task of detecting partial, single faces
from front camera captures are as follows:
• Single Face: Usually, a single person uses a mobile at any given time. There-
fore, we can focus on detecting a single large face, and can ignore small back-
ground faces. Also, one can assume that the user is not very close to the
phone. This assumption is checked by plotting a 2D histogram of face height
and width, as shown in Fig. 3.1. Analysing the distribution of face sizes, we
find that the height of faces vary from around 350 to 700 and the width varies
from 300 to 600, which indicates that we can focus on detecting faces in this
typical range only.
• Pose: Extreme pose variations are rare since when users tend to interact with
mobile devices, usually frontal images are captured.
3.2 Proposed Method
In this section we shall delineate the proposed algorithm, Deep Features based
Face Detection on Mobiles (DFFDM) and discuss the motivation for the design
choices and its salient features.
3.2.1 Introduction
Transferred learning is an effective way to incorporate deep networks. The
first step of the DFFDM algorithm is to extract deep features using the first 5 layers
of Alexnet. Different sized sliding windows are considered to account for faces of
12
Figure 3.1: Histogram showing distribution of bounding box widths and heights in
the training set of the AA-01 dataset
different sizes and an SVM is trained for each window size to detect faces of that
particular size. Then detections from all the SVMs are pooled together and some
candidates are suppressed based on a overlap criteria. Finally a single bounding box
is output by the detector. In the following subsections, the details of the algorithm
and model training are provided.
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3.2.2 Deep Features Computation
For training 5202 images from the UMDAA-01 database is used. As shown
in Fig. 3.1, the 2D histogram of face heights and widths, the height of faces vary
from around 350 to 700 and the width varies from 300 to 600. The original videos of
the AA-01 dataset are captured at 720p resolution. But since that resolution is too
high for our purpose, we resize it to half the resolution, that is 640× 360. Therefore
typical faces range from 175 to 350 rows and 150 to 300 columns in this reduced
resolution.
First we extract deep features from these resized images by forwarding them
through AlexNet [42]. We tap the network at the 5th convolutional layer (after the
max-pooling). The standard AlexNet reduces an image by a factor of 16 in both
dimensions. Thus if the input image is of size p × q, the output is of dimensions
fr × fc × 256, where 3.1
fr = dp/16e , fc = dq/16e (3.1)
The 3rd dimension is 256 because the 5th layer uses 256 filters. Given the
typical face dimensions in the last paragraph, they are reduced by a factor of 16 in




Once the features have been extracted, we turn to training SVMs to detect the
presence of faces. Obviously a single sized sliding window cannot account for these
varying sizes, therefore we consider windows of width starting from 8 and increasing
to 20 in steps of 2, and height starting from 9 and increasing in steps of 2 to 23. In
total we get 56 different window sizes for which we need to train 56 different SVMs.
We denote a window by Wij, where i denotes its window height and j denotes its
window width.
Let wk and hk denote the width and height of the deep feature for the face in
the kth training image. The face from the kth training image is used as a positive
sample for the SVM Wij, if we have 3.2
|i− hk| ≤ tp & |j − wk| ≤ tp (3.2)
for some threshold for selecting positive samples tp. That is, we select those faces
for Wij whose sizes are comparable and close to the window’s dimensions.
For negative samples, we extract random patches of size i × j from those
training samples which have no faces. If the kth training sample has a face of size
wkxhk, and for a particular window Wij, if we have 3.3
|i− hk| > tn & |j − wk| > tn (3.3)
for some threshold for selecting negative samples tn, then we extract a few
random patches from the kth training sample that act as negative samples for Wij.
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That is, if the face in an image is of a very different size from the current window
Wij under consideration, we extract negative samples from it, so that Wij gives a
negative response of faces of different size. Finally, since the UMDAA-01 database
does not have many images with no faces, we extract some random negative patches
from images of the UPenn Natural Image Database.
Once we have extracted the positive and negative samples for each window
size, we discard those window sizes which do not have enough positive examples.
Then we flatten the three dimensional deep feature patches into a single dimensional
feature vector. Thus forWij, we get a feature vector of length i×j×256. We estimate
the mean and standard deviation of features from each window, which are used to
normalize the features.
Next we train linear SVMs for each window. Since we get a very long feature
vector, it is difficult to train an SVM with all positive and negative samples together.
To make the training tractable, we divide the samples into batches and train over
many cycles. Specifically let pij be the number of positive samples for Wij. Then
we choose a small number of negative samples say nij and train the SVM. After
that we find the scores of the nij negative training samples using the weights we get
after training and retain only those that are close to the separating hyperplane and
discard the rest. We refill the negative samples batch with new negative samples
and continue this cycle multiple times. This procedure is repeated for each SVM.
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3.2.4 Full Face Detection Pipeline
After the SVMs are trained, we can scan the deep feature extracted from the
given image in a sliding window fashion for each SVM. Specifically for an image of
size p × q, the deep feature is of fr rows and fc columns as given by 3.1 and 256
depth. Therefore for Wij, we can slide the window from position (1, 1), which is the
top left, to (fr − i, fc − j). Let (rij, cij) denote the position where the SVM yields
highest score. Then we say that a bounding box, whose top left is at 16 ∗ (rij, cij)
and has width 16 × j and height 16 × i is the prediction from Wij. Note that we
multiply 16, because the feature space is approximately 16 times smaller than the
original image.
Now that we have 1 prediction from each of the 56 SVMs we need to combine
them to get a single prediction. A modified version of the non maximal suppression
scheme used by Girshick et al. [43] is used for this purpose. First we sort the 56
proposals by their scores and then pick the candidate with highest score. Boxes
that overlap significantly with it and have a considerably lower score than it are
ignored. This is continued for the next highest scoring candidate in the list, till
all boxes are checked. After this we sort the remaining candidates by size. If a
larger box significantly overlaps a smaller box, but the larger box has a slightly
lower score than the smaller box, we suppress the smaller box. This is useful in the
following scenario: A smaller SVM may give a strong response for part of a full face,
while the larger SVM responsible for detecting faces of that size may give a slightly
lower response. But clearly the larger SVM is making the correct prediction, so we
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Figure 3.2: Overview of the deep feature based face detection algorithm for mobile
devices.
need to suppress the overlapping smaller SVM’s candidate. After performing these
suppressions, we pick the SVM’s candidate that has the highest score. We then
choose a suitable threshold, and if final candidate’s score is larger than that, we
declare a face is present at that location, else declare that there is no face present.
3.2.5 Design Choices and Salient Features
In this section, we discuss some of the design choices that were made for
DFFDM.
Transferred Learning : The DFFDM algorithm seeks to focus on images typical
in the AA case, for which AA-01 is a publicly available dataset. The dataset is
very challenging, as can be seen from the samples shown in Fig. 3.7, hence it
is clear that a deep network based method must be used to achieve acceptably
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good performance. While the AA-01 dataset has a large numbered of unannotated
frames it only has 8036 images with facial bounding boxes annotated by hand.
Given current dataset sizes, it is a small number, and perhaps not enough to train a
deep network. One possible solution to this dilemma, is to use transferred learning.
As studied in [44], deep features extracted from deep networks trained on large
datasets are often transferable to new domains, with a little fine-tuning. With that
in mind, we choose to follow this path to address the conflicting requirement of a
deep network based method, but on a small training set.
Sliding Window : Sliding window approaches usually work on the principle of
extracting appropriate features and then sliding a window and deciding if an object
is present in that window or not. This is a very common technique. For example,
the classic algorithm on pedestrian detection using HOG features [45] works on this
principle. In the proposed algorithm, DFFDM can be thought of as using DCNs to
extract the features for the sliding window approach.
Scale Invariance and Robustness to Occlusion : However to make the sliding
window approach work for detecting objects of varying scales, we need to extract
features across scaled versions of the input image. The approach followed by Ranjan
et al. in [30] is based on extracting deep features at multiple resolutions of the image
and then training a single SVM to detect faces. Clearly extracting deep features is a
very costly operation because of the sheer number of convolutions involved. Passing
the image at multiple resolutions through the network increases the workload even
more. Therefore the proposed algorithm passes the image through the DCN only
once, but trains SVMs of different sizes to achieve scale invariance. Also the different
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SVM sizes helps detect partial faces. For example a tall and thin windowed SVMs
are usually trained with left half or right half faces, while short and fat windowed
SVMs are trained for top half of faces. SVMs whose aspect ratio match a normal
face’s aspect ratio are trained on full faces. Thus different sized windows help in
scale invariance as well as in detecting partial faces.
Number of Parameters : The Alexnet deep feature extractor has 2,334,080
parameters and the 56 SVMs have 3,211,264 parameters, making the total 5,545,344
parameters.
3.3 Implementation
Popular deep learning platforms include Caffe, Theano and Torch. Although
these platforms have a CPU only version, they are significantly slower than the
GPU enabled versions. These platforms have a CUDA based backend that offloads
the heavy, but parallelizable, computations involved in a convolutional deep net-
work to an Nvidia GPU. Thus, although there are multiple platforms in the deep
learning ecosystem, the computational backend is dominated by CUDA based code
and Nvidia GPUs. Unfortunately, CUDA is proprietary and works only for Nvidias
CUDA enabled GPUs. Current mobile devices have GPUs that are predominantly
provided by Adreno, Mali and PowerVR. Therefore existing deep learning frame-
works are difficult to port on to GPUs made by other vendors.
OpenCL [46] is an open standard, developed by Khronos Group, to support
multiple vendors and facilitate cross platform heterogeneous and parallel computing.
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All major vendors like Qualcomm, Samsung, Apple, Nvidia, Intel and ARM conform
to the OpenCL standard. Thus OpenCL is a portable option or implementing
convolutional networks in GPUs other than those made by Nvidia. Recently though,
Google has developed RenderScript to facilitate heterogeneous computing on the
Android platform.
Mobile devices are obviously not an ideal platform to perform training on
massive datasets. But once the model has been trained, we can hope to run the
forward pass on mobile platforms. Thus to harness GPUs of mobile devices to
perform the convolution heavy forward pass, we have implemented OpenCL and
RenderScript based libraries. The OpenCL library is general and should work on any
GPU, while the RenderScript library is specifically tailored for Android. An Android
specific example is the use of Schraudolp’s fast exponentiation [47] to approximately
but quickly compute the normalization layer in AlexNet. Full exponentiation takes
a significant amount of time and can become bottlenecks in weaker mobile GPUs.
The primary ingredients for a basic convolutional deep network are convolution
and activation layers, max pooling layers and normalization layers, each of which
can be parallelized on GPUs. By appropriately stacking up these layers in the
correct combination and initializing the network with pre-trained weights we can
build a CNN easily. For our purpose we have implemented the AlexNet network as
described earlier. For an image of size 360× 640, a single forward pass, running on
a machine with 4th generation Intel Core i7 and Nvidia GeForce GTX 850M GPU,
takes about 1 second for the OpenCL implementation. For an image of the same
size, on the Renderscript implementation running on different phones, we summarize
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Table 3.1: Run times of DFFDM on different mobile platforms
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the run time results in Table 3.1. Only about 10% or less of this run time is due to
max-pooling layer, normalization layer and SVMs. The rest of the time is due to the
heavy computations of the convolutional layers. Continuously running the algorithm
drains the battery at 0.42% per minute, while leaving the phone undisturbed drains
the battery at around 0.16% per minute.
3.4 Evaluation and Results
For evaluation, we consider common metrics like Precision-Recall plots, F1
scores and Accuracy. We compare the performance of our algorithm on the AA-
01 [48] and MOBIO [49] [50] datasets with Deep Pyramid Deformable Part Model
(DP2MFD) [30], which is among the state-of-the-art algorithms for some challenging
datasets like AFW [51] and FDDB [2], deformable part model for face detection
(DPM) [52] and Viola Jones detector (VJ) [53].
We compute detections based on 50% intersection over union criteria. Let d
be the detected bounding box, g be the ground truth box and s be the associated
score of the detected box d. Then for declaring a detection to be valid, we need Eq.
(3.4) to be satisfied for some threshold t
area(d ∩ g)
area(d ∪ g)
> 0.5 & s ≥ t. (3.4)
3.4.1 AA-01 Dataset
Results on AA-01 dataset are summarized in Table 3.2.
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Metric DFFDM DP2MFD DPM VJ
Max F1 92.8% 89.0% 84.1% 67.7%
Max Accuracy 88.0% 82.3% 76.4% 58.0%
Recall at 95%
precision
85.7% 81.7% 72.6% -
Table 3.2: Comparision of different metrics for various detectors on UMD-AA
database
To check the robustness of the detector, we vary the intersection-over-union
threshold as defined in Eq. (3.4) from 0.1 to 0.9 and plot the resulting F1 score in
Figure 3.5 and accuracy in Figure 3.6. We see that the DFFDM algorithm gives
better performance at higher overlap thresholds too.
A few example positive and negative detections are shown in Fig. 3.7. The
detections are marked in red, while the ground truth is in yellow. The first row
shows a few examples of positive detections with partial faces and the second row
shows positive detections with pose variations. The third row shows some false
detections, or detections with score lesser than 1. The detector is quite robust to
illumination change and is able to detect partial or extremely posed faces.
3.4.2 MOBIO Dataset
Results on MOBIO dataset are summarized in Table 3.3. The MOBIO dataset
has full frontal faces only, therefore we get very high performance. DP2MFD beats
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Figure 3.3: Precision Recall plot corresponding to the AA-01 dataset.
our algorithm for this dataset, which can be attributed to the fact that DP2MFD
is one of the best algorithms, trained on a large, varied dataset, and for full frontal
faces it has near perfect performance over multiple scales. For DFFDM, SVMs
of different sizes were trained, based on the typical size of faces captured by the
front camera. But sometimes for very large or small faces, the training dataset
of UMD-AA may not have enough samples, therefore for extremely scaled faces,
DFFMD may fail. This can be remedied by training on a larger database, and also
by training SVMs on more scales. A few example positive and negative detections
are shown in Figure 3.7. The first row shows positive detections while the second
row shows failures. As the examples show, there are some false detections for really
large faces, of which we did not have many examples in the AA-01 training dataset
on which DFFDM was trained.
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Figure 3.4: Examples of positive (1st row) and negative (2nd row) detections on
MOBIO. The detector's output is in red, while ground truth is in yellow.
Metric DFFDM DP2MFD DPM VJ
Max F1 97.9% 99.7% 97.8% 92.6%
Max Accu-
racy
96.0% 99.3% 95.8% 86.3%
Table 3.3: Comparision of different metrics for various detectors on MOBIO
database
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Figure 3.5: Plot showing variation of F1 score with respect to overlap threshold
corresponding to the AA-01 dataset.























Figure 3.6: Plot showing variation of accuracy with respect to overlap threshold
corresponding to the AA-01 dataset.
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Figure 3.7: Examples of positive detections (with pose variations and occlusion) and
examples of negative detections (due to insufficient overlap or small score) in the
AA-01 dataset. The detector’s output is in red, while ground truth is in yellow.
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Chapter 4: DeepSegFace: Pooling Facial Segments to Detect Partial
Faces
In this section, we shall introduce DeepSegFace, a deep convolutional neural
network (DCNN) that is designed to detect partial faces, by pooling together features
from facial segments.
4.1 Proposed Algorithm
In this section we shall propose the DeepSegFace algorithm and look at its
relation to other associated methods.
4.1.1 Introduction
DeepSegFace consists of 2 stages, a proposal generation stage, followed by a
classification stage. A ’proposal’ in this context is a collection of bounding boxes of
facial segments (like left half, upper half etc), which might constitute a whole face.
In the proposal generation phase, weak, fast classifiers detects facial segments, and
comes to a consensus if a face is present. Then these detected segments are sent to
a DCNN classifier, which outputs a single probability value about the presence or
absence of a face.
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Figure 4.1: Facial segments as proposed in [1]
4.1.2 Proposal generation
In our proposal generation scheme, 9 parts are used, namely: nose (Nose), eye-
pair (Eye), upper-left three-fourth (UL34), upper-right three-fourth (UR34), upper-
half (U12), left three-fourth (L34), upper-left-half (UL12), right-half (R12) and left-
half (L12. They are shown in Fig. 4.1. These 9 parts are chosen based on the
analysis in selecting the best combination Cbest for detecting faces in [1].
The set of facial segments is denoted by S = {ak | k = 1, 2, . . .M}, where
M = 9 is the number of segments under consideration and ak is a particular facial
segment. M = 9 weak Adaboost facial segment detectors are trained to detect each
of the segments in S. Following the method described in [1], first we estimate the
face centers given a detected segment by simple geometrical considerations. For
example, for the U12 segment, the face center is estimated to lie at the center of the
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last row of the detected segment.
Close estimates of face centers are considered to belong to the same face pro-
posal. Once the face centers are estimated, they are clustered into clusters CLj,
j = {1, 2, . . . cI} as discussed in [1]. Here, cI is the number of clusters formed for
image I. A bounding box for the whole face BCLj is calculated based on the con-
stituent segments. The proposals are winnowed by deleting clusters that give rise
to the exact same full face bounding box proposal.
Consider a cluster composed of segments S. Denoting the power set by P ,
possible non-empty sets of segments are SP ∈ P(S) − {∅} and P . A proposal P
can be the full face estimate computed from any of these sets SP . However, we only
consider those sets which have a atleast c segments, so that it is ensured we get a
robust estimate. We set c = 2, a low value, so that it does not miss out any face
(high recall), at the cost of generating lots of false positives (low precision). This
lets one generate a large number of proposals, so that any face is not missed in this
stage. However since the number of subsets can be very large, since it is exponential
in the number of segments, we choose at most ζ = 10 face proposals from each
cluster by selecting random subsets of face segments constituting that cluster.
4.1.3 Proposal Classification
DeepSegFace integrates deep CNNs and segments-based face detection from
proposals such as [1]. DeepSegFace, accepts as inputs, subsets of the M = 9 face
parts as discussed earlier, for each image. DeepSegFace is then trained to calculate
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Figure 4.2: Block diagram showing DeepSegFace architecture.
the probability values of the proposal being a face. Finally, a re-ranking step adjusts
the probability values from the network. The proposal with the maximum re-ranked
score is deemed as the detection for that image.
The architecture of DeepSegFace is arranged according to the classic paradigm
in pattern recognition: feature extraction, dimensionality reduction followed by a
classifier. A block diagram of the architecture is shown in Fig. 4.2. Different
components of the figure are discussed here.
Convolutional Feature Extraction: There are nine convolutional network columns,
structurally similar to VGG16 [54] and initialized with its pretrained weights, for
each of the nine segments. Thus each network has thirteen convolution layers ar-
ranged in five blocks. Each segment in the proposal is resized to standard dimensions
for that segment, then the VGG mean value is subtracted from each channel. If a
segment is absent in the proposal, zero-input is fed into the network input corre-
sponding to that segment, as shown for the Nose segment in the figure.
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Dimensionality reduction: The last convolutional feature map has 512 chan-
nels, hence naively concatenating them results in a very large 65, 536-D feature
vector. Hence, a randomly initialized convolutional layer with filter size 1 × 1 and
50 feature maps is appended to provide a learnable dimension reduction, which
reduces the feature size to 6400 only, as shown in Table 4.1.
Classifier : The classifier receives a 6400 dimensional feature vector from the
dimensionality reduction block as shown in Table 4.1. That is passed through a fully
connected layer of 250 nodes, followed by a softmax layer of two nodes (both ran-
domly initialized). The two outputs of the softmax layer sum to one and correspond
to the probability of the presence or absence of a face.
Re-ranking : The DeepSegFace network outputs the face detection probabilities
for each proposal in an image, which can be used to rank the proposals and then
declare the highest probability proposal as the face in that image. We only consider
the highest score proposal the face, because in the AA scenario, we assume that
there is only one face present in the image. However there is some prior knowledge
that some segments are more effective at detecting the presence of faces than others.
After computing the prior probabilities of detecting a face given that a segment was
present in the proposal, we multiply the score from the DeepSegFace network with
the mean of the priors.
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Table 4.1: Structure of DeepSegFace’s Convolutional layers (feature extraction and
dimensionality reduction)
Segment Input Feature Dim. Reduce Flatten
Nose 3× 69× 81 512× 2× 2 50× 2× 2 200
Eye 3× 54× 162 512× 1× 5 50× 1× 5 250
UL34 3× 147× 147 512× 4× 4 50× 4× 4 800
UR34 3× 147× 147 512× 4× 4 50× 4× 4 800
U12 3× 99× 192 512× 3× 6 50× 3× 6 900
L34 3× 192× 147 512× 6× 4 50× 6× 4 1200
UL12 3× 99× 99 512× 3× 3 50× 3× 3 450
R12 3× 192× 99 512× 6× 3 50× 6× 3 900
L12 3× 192× 99 512× 6× 3 50× 6× 3 900
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4.1.4 Segment Drop-out for Regularization and Data Augmentation
As mentioned in the proposal generation scheme, subsets of face segments in a
cluster are used to generate new proposals. For example, if a cluster of face segments








proposals. However, all the nine parts are redundant for
detecting a face, because of significant overlaps and often many segments are not
detected by the weak segment detectors.
To make the network robust to missing segment detections, generalize better
and also to effectively perform data augmentation, we use segment drop-out when
training, i.e. some of the input signals are randomly missing and set to zero. Around
sixteen proposals are generated per image. Many of these proposals are actually
training the network to detect the same face using different combination of segments.
4.1.5 Comparision with related methods
Table 4.2 shows a comparision between DeepSegFace and two related meth-
ods, namely FSFD and SegFace. FSFD introduced the proposal generation scheme
described above and SegFace extends it in [55].
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Table 4.2: Comparison of the proposed methods
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The proposal generator used in FSFD, which was used in trained on LFW, is
used as the proposal generator for DeepSegFace. The DeepSegFace DCNN is trained
on the training set of UMDAA-02-FD dataset.
For testing DeepSegFace, experimental results on the AA-01-FD and UMDAA-
02-FD datasets are compared with a) Normalized Pixel Difference (NPD)-based
detector [29], b) Hyperface detector [7], c) Deep Pyramid Deformable Part Model
detector [56], d) DPM baseline detector [28], and e) Facial Segment-based Face De-
tector (FSFD) [1]. Both SegFace and DeepSegFace are trained on 3964 images from
AA-01-FD and trained models are validated using 1238 images. The data augmen-
tation process produces 57, 756 proposals from the training set, that is around 14.5
proposals per image. The remaining 2835 images of AA-01-FD are used for testing.
For UMDAA-02-FD, 32, 642 images are used for testing. In all experiments with
SegFace and DeepSegFace, c = 2 and ζ = 10 is considered.
Some samples detections can be seen in Fig. 4.7. The quantitative results are
evaluated by comparing the ROC curve and precision-recall curves of these detectors
since all of them return a confidence score for detection. The goal is to achieve high
True Acceptance Rate (TAR) at a very low False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and also
a high recall at a very high precision. Hence, numerically, the value of TAR at 1%
FPR and recall achieved by a detector at 99% precision are the two metrics that
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Table 4.3: Comparison at 50% overlap on AA-01-FD and UMDAA-02-FD datasets
Methods
AA-01 UMDAA-02
TAR at Recall at TAR at Recall at
1% FAR 99% Prec. 1% FAR 99% Prec.
NPD [29] 29.51 11.0 33.49 26.79
DPMBaseline [28] 85.08 83.25 78.48 72.79
DeepPyramid [56] 66.17 42.35 71.19 66.07
HyperFace [7] 90.52 90.32 73.01 71.14
FSFD Cbest [1] 59.06 55.65 55.74 26.88
SegFace 67.12 63.09 66.44 61.47
DeepSegFace 87.16 86.49 82.26 76.28
are used to compare different methods.
In table 4.3, the performance of SegFace and DeepSegFace are compared with
state-of-the-arts methods for both datasets. From the measures on the AA-01-FD
dataset, it can be seen that SegFace, in spite of being a traditional feature based algo-
rithm, outperforms several algorithms like FSFD and even DCNN based algorithms
such as NPD and DeepPyramid. On the other hand, DeepSegFace outperforms all
the other methods except HyperFace in terms of the two evaluation measures on
the AA-01-FD dataset. Hyperface is a state-of-the-art algorithm that is trained on
over 20, 000 images, compared to only 5202 images used to train DeepSegFace. Also
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Figure 4.3: Images without even one good proposal returned by the proposal gen-
eration mechanism. This bottleneck can be removed by using better proposal gen-
eration schemes.
Figure 4.4: (a) for 57756 Train Proposals from AA-01-FD Dataset, (b) 39168 Test
Proposals from AA-01-FD Dataset, and (c) 410138 Test Proposals from UMDAA-
02-FD dataset. In all cases c = 2 and ζ = 10.
Hyperface uses R-CNN to generate face proposals, compared to the fast weak clas-
sifiers used by DeepSegFace. Furthur analysis reveals that one of the bottlenecks
of DeepSegFace’s performance is the proposal generation phase, thus its perfor-
mance can increase if it uses a more powerful proposal generation scheme, such as
R-CNN [57].
In Fig. 4.3, some images are shown for which the proposal generator did not
return any proposals or returned proposals without sufficient overlap, even though
there are somewhat good, visible faces or facial segments in them. The percentage
of true faces that are represented by at least one proposal in the list of proposals for
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the training and test sets are counted. The result of this analysis is shown in Fig.
4.4. The bar graphs denote the percentage of positive samples and negative samples
present in the proposal list generated for a certain overlap ratio. For example, out of
the 55, 756 proposals generated for training, there are approximately 62% positive
samples and 35% negative samples at an overlap ratio of 50%. Considering the
overlap ratio fixed to 50% for this experiment, it can be seen from the line plot in
Fig. 4.4(b), corresponding to the AA-01-FD test set, that the proposal generator
actually represent 89.18% of the true faces successfully and fails to generate a single
good proposal for the rest of the images. Hence, the performance of the proposed
detectors are upper-bounded by this number on this dataset, a constraint that can be
mitigated by using advanced proposal schemes like R-CNN which generates around
2000 proposals per image for Hyperface, compared to just around sixteen proposals
that are generated by the fast proposal generator employed by DeepSegFace.
However, when considering the UMDAA-02-FD test set, which is completely
unconstrained and has almost ten times more images than AA-01-FD test set, this
upper bound might not be so bad. From Fig. 4.4(c) it can be seen that the upper
bound for UMDAA-02-FD is 87.57% true positive value. Now, in Fig. 4.5, the ROC
for this dataset is shown. It can be seen that the DeepSegFace method outperforms
all the other methods, including HyperFace, with a large margin even with the
upper bound (the curve flattens around 87.5%). This is because all the traditional
methods suffer so much more when detecting mobile faces in truly unconstrained
settings that a true acceptance rate of even 87% is hard to achieve. It is to be
noted that the data collection process for AA-01-FD was task-based [14] and hence,
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Figure 4.5: ROC curve for comparison of different face detection methods on the
UMDAA-02 dataset
Figure 4.6: Precision-Recall curve for comparison of different face detection methods
on the UMDAA-02 dataset.
supervised, while UMDAA-02-FD was collected in a completely natural setting [34].
The precision-recall curve for UMDAA-02-FD dataset is shown in Fig. 4.6. It can
be seen that the DeepSegFace method has much better recall at 99% precision than
any other method. In both figures, the performance of SegFace is found satisfactory
given its dependency on traditional features. In fact, the curves are not too far off
from the DeepPyramid method, which is DCNN-based.
The proposals for both test sets are analyzed to reveal that on an average only
three segments per proposal are present for both datasets. Thus, while there are
nine convolutional networks in the architecture, only three of them need to fire on
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an average for generating scores from the proposals. When forwarding proposals in
batch sizes of 256, DeepSegFace takes around 0.02 seconds per proposal on a GTX
Titan-X GPU. SegFace takes around 0.49 seconds when running on a Intel Xeon
CPU E-2623 v4 (2.604 GHz) machine with 32GB Memory without multi-threading,
hence it is possible to optimize it to run on mobile devices in reasonable time without
specialized hardware.
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Figure 4.7: Sample face detection outcome of the proposed DeepSegFace method
on the UMDAA-02-FD dataset. The first three rows show correct detections at
different illumination, pose and partial visibility scenarios, while the last row shows
some incorrect detections. Red boxes denote DeepSegFace detection, while green
boxes denote ground truth
43
Chapter 5: Face Illumination Detection and its Applications in Tam-
pering Detection
In this section we shall look at techniques of determining the illumination
conditions of a face and use that information to determine if an image has been
tampered. Specifically, we hope to identify cases when a face is taken from one
image and transplanted into another.
5.1 Introduction
In this section we shall establish some preliminary concepts before diving into
details in the next section.
In this work, we assume a single point source light. As such, it can be charac-
terized by 2 numbers, namely, elevation and azimuth angles. It is enough to consider
an elevation angle in the range [0, π] and an azimuth in the range [−π/2, π/2], when
considering faces. Another possible way of characterizing illumination is by using
Spherical Harmonic Lighting [58]. As input to the system, we assume that we al-
ready have a face bounding box from a face detector. Thus a 2D face crop is input
to the system, which outputs the elevation and azimuth angles of the illumination.
When discussing about tampered images, we focus on a particular case of
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tampering: One where a face or a person has been cropped from a source image
and been pasted into a new target or tampered or spoofed image.
To detect tampering, we basically wish to perform some sort of illumination
verification where we ask the question if two faces have the same or different illumi-
nations. This is analogous to the problem of face verification, where we ask if two
face images belong to the same person. We can adopt two strategies:
• Compute and Compare: In this approach, we train a network to compute the
illumination and then compare them. The comparision can be done using a
simple metric like euclidean distance or by learning a more discriminative met-
ric. This is analogous to face verification by first performing face recognition.
• Direct Verification: Here, we train a network that focuses on learning if two
illumination conditions are same, rather than trying to predict the actual
illumination conditions. This is analogous to face verification by Siamese net-
works.
5.2 Proposed Method
As mentioned in the previous section 5.1, there are 2 methods of performing
verification. However, one can also combine both, that is attempt to predict the
actual illumination as well as learn to predict if two illuminations are the same. The
proposed solution, IllumNet is described below.
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Figure 5.1: Network Architecture of IllumNet, showing the main identical classifiers
C0 and C1 arranged in Siamese style.
5.2.1 Network Architecture
5.2.1.1 Inputs and Outputs
Firstly, the Hyperface [7] face detector is run on the images, to get face bound-
ing boxes. These crops are then normalized to lie in the range [−0.5, 0.5]. The faces
crops are resized to 224× 224.
We consider the elevation angle to be in the range [0, π] and an azimuth in
the range [−π/2, π/2]. These ranges are enough to cover light sources lying on a
hemisphere in front of the face. Also, instead of trying to predict the exact angles,
we focus on predicting an approximate location by considering that there are 13
linearly spaced divisions dividing the π radians considered in the range. Discretizing




Our proposed method consists of a pair of identical networks C0 and C1. Both
Ci networks are classification networks, which have a common trunk that is made
of resnet blocks. At the end of the common trunk, the network branches into 2
subnetworks that each produce 13 probabilities, one number each for the 13 classes
of elevation and azimuth angles. The two classifier networks are in blue in Fig. 5.1
5.2.1.3 Siamese Network for Illumination Verification
While directly attempting to predict and compare the illumination to deter-
mine if two illuminations are the same might work, it might be a simpler task to
answer the question if they are the same. Therefore to bake in verification, along
with classification, a Siamese network like arrangement is proposed. As shown in
green in Fig. 5.1, convolutional side channel networks Sk0 and S
k
1 tap into interme-
diate layers of the main classifiers C0 and C1. Outputs of the side channel networks
S and the outputs of the main classifiers C are concatenated to create an intermedi-
ate verification feature vector. These feature vectors are passed through some fully
connected layers F0 and F1 to yield the final verification feature v0 and v1. The fully




The main classifiers are trained with categorical crossentropy losses. Thus











losses for the azimuth prediction, while LE0 and L
E
1 penalize the azimuth prediction.
To train the network as a verifier, a contrastive loss LC is used. The contrastive loss
is defined as follows:
LC = 0.5(‖v0 − v1‖(1− Y ) +max(0, 1− ‖v0 − v1‖)Y ) (5.1)
where Y is an indicator variable that is 0 when the two illuminations are similar,
and 1 otherwise.
5.2.3 Training and Testing Data
Datasets with illumination conditions are rare indeed. One such dataset is
the CMU Multi-PIE Face Dataset [59]. It contains subjects faces captured under
multiple illuminations and viewpoints. While it has sufficient variations in illumina-
tion azimuth, it does not have a lot of variation in elevation. From this dataset, we
choose 34, 211 training images, 1, 925 validation images and 5, 362 testing images.
Generating synthetic face images is one way to get around this paucity of
labelled data. To that end, we use the Basel Face 3D Morphable Face Model [60]
(BFM). The BFM geometry consists of 53, 490 3D vertices connected by 160, 470
mesh triangles. This basic model can be varied by using different linear combinations
of 199 principal components that control shape and texture. Random coefficients
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for the principal components were generated to render faces under random lighting
conditions. This was used to create a synthetic dataset of 17, 000 training images,
1, 000 validation images and 4, 223 test images.
Finally, only for testing illumination verification performance we consider two
more datasets: AFW and Portraits. AFW is a well known face detection dataset.
We consider all the images in AFW that have 5 or less faces. We leave out other
images with more than 5 faces, because those faces wold be too small to correctly
deduce illumination conditions from. These chosen images yield 230 pairs of faces
that belong to the same images, and of the many possible pairs of faces that belong
to different images, we randomly choose 230, to keep the dataset balanced. The
idea is to create a dataset of pairs of faces from the same or different images.
Portraits dataset was developed at the University of Maryland to study image
tampering detection. It consists of pairs of faces that come from tampered and
non-tampered images, along with labels indicating if they have been tampered.
5.2.4 Experimental Setup
First, we train the network on the training split of Multi-PIE and then test it
on the test split. The ROC of the test results are shown in Fig. 5.2. The solid lines
show the verification performance of IllumNet when using the verification features
vi, while the dotted lines show the verification results when directly comparing the
illumination predictions from the main classifiers C0 and C1. This graph indicates
that training in a Siamese fashion helps with verification.
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Figure 5.2: ROC of test split of Multi-PIE from a IllumNet trained on Multi-PIE
train set. We observe that the adding the siamese style verification network given
better performance, compared to just using classification results for verification.
Next, consider the pairs constructed from the AFW dataset and the Portraits
dataset as described in section 5.2.3. The ROC plots for these 2 datasets are shown
in Fig. 5.3. The histograms of the euclidean distances of the verification features
of both datasets are shown in Fig. 5.4. The histograms clearly show that simi-
lar illumination conditions create verification feature vectors that produce smaller
euclidean distance, compared to dissimilar pairs.
5.3 Adversarial Training
As mentioned in the last section, there is a scarcity of data with annotated
ground truth illumination. While synthetic data can be generated, networks trained
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Figure 5.3: Verification ROC of AFW and Portraits datasets
on that cannot be expected to perform as well on real data. Hence we must turn to
intelligent data augmentation techniques. We propose the intelligent data augmen-
tation for training an illumination classifier.
5.3.1 Proposed Method
Consider the setup shown in Fig. 5.7. It shows 2 networks A and I lined
up serially. For this consider I to be the main classifier C of IllumNet. The other
network A is an adversarial network, that tries to generate occlusions that cause
network I to produce incorrect classifications. However, it is desirable that net-
work A introduces very small occlusions to fool network I, otherwise without that
constraint network A might occlude the whole image.
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Figure 5.4: Score histograms of similar and dissimilar pairs of AFW and Portraits
datasets, showing a clear separation of scores between tampered and non-tampered
pairs
5.3.2 Adversarial Occlusion Generation
First we shall discuss Binary Stochastic Neurons, then the architecture of the
adversarial network, its losses and other training details.
5.3.2.1 Adversarial Occlusion Generation
Before delving into the adversarial network, let us discuss the use of the Binary
Stochastic Neuron (BSN) briefly here. The adversarial network A is being used to
generate a binary mask of 1 and 0. To do so it produces a probability. But to
generate the actual mask, we need to threshold the probability. However, it is
well known that a thresholding function is non-differentiable and thus makes back
propagation difficult. To get around this difficulty, we can use Binary Stochastic
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Figure 5.5: Samples from the AFW dataset. The first column contains face pairs
from the same images, while the second column contains face pairs from different
images. The first row contains face pairs which were predicted to be in the same
image, while the second row contains pairs predicted to be in different images
Neurons (BSN). BSNs allow us to simulate a hard threshold activation. The forward
pass of BSN is a simple thresholding given by eq. 5.2.
BSN(x) = 1z<sigm(x), z ∼ U [0, 1] (5.2)
There are two varieties of BSN: Straight-through and REINFORCE. The for-
ward equation for both variants is simple thresholding and is given by eq. 5.2.
However, they differ in the estimators they use for the gradient during back propa-
gation.
For the straight-through variant, we simply use 1 instead of 0 as the derivative.
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Figure 5.6: Architecture of the adversarial network. Its inputs are a 100-D noise
vector and the face crop image, while its output is a binary mask. The green sections
are convolutional blocks while the yellow sections are deconvolutional blocks.
Another possibility is to use the derivative of the sigmoid function, along with slope-
annealing [61]. The REINFORCE estimator was proposed in [62] and estimates the










5.3.2.2 Adversarial Network Architecture
We want to train an adversarial network A accepts an input face image and
produces a binary mask of the same size. Pixels that have corresponding mask value
1 are allowed to pass through, while pixels with mask value 0 are suppressed.
To do so, we create an adversarial network, which accepts the image and a 100
dimensional noise vector as input. The image is passed through convolutional layers
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while the noise is passed through deconvolutional layers. They are then concatenated
and passed through more convolutional and deconvolutional layers. Finally, the last
deconvolutional layer outputs a 56× 56× 1 tensor, which is passed through a BSN
layer. The architecture is summarized in fig. 5.6.
Once the 56× 56 thresholded map is obtained, it is upsampled by a factor of
4 to yield a 224 × 224 occlusion map. This is multiplied pointwise with the input
image to produce the occluded image.
5.3.3 Training and Losses
The training proceeds as follows: We train the illumination network I with one
batch of data, while keeping the adversarial network A fixed, then we train network
A while keeping network I fixed. The loss for network I is simply categorical cross
entropy loss LE, since we model the illumination detection as a classification problem
rather than a regression.
To ensure we get certain desirable properties in the generated occlusion masks,
we employ the following losses listed below:
• Misclassifiation Loss LM : First and foremost, the occlusion should be success-
ful in inducing an incorrect classification in network I. Let NC be the number
of classes, the network predicts class p, while the ground truth is class c. If
|c− p| is large, then LM should be small. This is achieved by defining defining
LM according to eq. 5.4.
• Distortion Loss LD: The occluded area should be as small. We define this
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Figure 5.7: Network architecture, training scheme and losses of the proposed adver-
sarial training scheme. In each training iteration, first network A trains with affinity
loss LA, distortion loss LD and misclassification loss LM , then network I trains with
categorical crossentropy loss LE.
loss as LD = R(P (mask) − 0.2). R represents the ReLU function, while P
represents the percentage of masked pixels. This loss allows 20% of the pixels
to be modified without any loss, and after that the loss scales linearly.
• Affinity Loss LA: The occluded area should be clustered together. If it is
spread out randomly, the mask will look like random noise and not an occlu-
sion. A tightly clustered occluded area is useful in simulating real life occlu-
sions. To compute this loss, we find the absolute difference of each element of






The total loss for the adversarial network A is a weighted sum of the losses
discussed above and is given by equation 5.5
LA = LA + 2LM + LD (5.5)
The training process of altering between training network A and network I
and their corresponding losses are summarized in fig. 5.7.
5.3.4 Experimental Results
Fig. 5.8 shows the effect of adversarial occlusion for some images from the
Multi-PIE and synthetic datasets. We observe that the occlusions are well-clustered,
occupy only a small region of the image and seem to focus on the cheek region.
Cheeks are smooth, reflective regions on the face, which are useful in inferring the
source of illumination. By choosing to occlude the cheeks, the adversarial occluder
A, makes the job of the illumination network more difficult. The adversarial mask
also gives us an indication of the parts of the face that the illumination network I
considers important for inferring illumination.
For training, we use both CGI and Multi-PIE datasets as described in the
last section. We evaluate by reporting the test set accuracy. When trained with-
out adversary, we get 71.45% accuracy, while on training with adversarial network,
we get 73.93% accuracy. Thus this data augmentation scheme, seems to help in
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In this work, we looked at two problems relating to security applications using
face analysis.
The first problem we address is detecting faces in the Active Authentication
(AA) setting, where we tackle partial face detection. We first propose a transfer
learning-based solution to the problem DFFDM, and then a deep learning-based
solution, DeepSegFace. Extensive experiments on AA datasets such as AA-01 and
UMDAA-02 show that the methods are very effecting in the AA setting.
The second problem addressed is using illumination information to decide if
a face image has been transplanted into an image. Under the assumption that
faces in the same image should have similar illumination, we propose an algorithm
that detects illumination discrepancies as an indicator of tampering. We extend the
proposed method by implementing an adversarial data augmentation scheme.
Future directions include incorporating network compression methods into the
face detection algorithms that will allow them to run faster on mobile platforms.
Another possible extension would be to develop an algorithm that detects tampering
by finding inconsistencies in illumination of general objects, and not just faces.
59
Bibliography
[1] U. Mahbub, V. M. Patel, D. Chandra, B. Barbello, and R. Chellappa. Par-
tial face detection for continuous authentication. In 2016 IEEE International
Conference on Image Processing (ICIP), pages 2991–2995, Sept 2016.
[2] Vidit Jain and Erik Learned-Miller. Fddb: A benchmark for face detection
in unconstrained settings. Technical Report UM-CS-2010-009, University of
Massachusetts, Amherst, 2010.
[3] M. Kostinger, P. Wohlhart, P.M. Roth, and H. Bischof. Annotated facial land-
marks in the wild: A large-scale, real-world database for facial landmark lo-
calization. In Computer Vision Workshops (ICCV Workshops), 2011 IEEE
International Conference on, pages 2144–2151, Nov 2011.
[4] Shuo Yang, Ping Luo, Chen Change Loy, and Xiaoou Tang. Wider face: A face
detection benchmark. In IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern
Recognition (CVPR), 2016.
[5] Deva Ramanan. Face detection, pose estimation, and landmark localization in
the wild. In Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and
Pattern Recognition (CVPR), CVPR ’12, pages 2879–2886, Washington, DC,
USA, 2012. IEEE Computer Society.
[6] Rajeev Ranjan, Swami Sankaranarayanan, Carlos D. Castillo, and Rama Chel-
lappa. An all-in-one convolutional neural network for face analysis. CoRR,
abs/1611.00851, 2016.
[7] Rajeev Ranjan, Vishal M. Patel, and Rama Chellappa. Hyperface: A deep
multi-task learning framework for face detection, landmark localization, pose
estimation, and gender recognition. CoRR, abs/1603.01249, 2016.
[8] M. E. Fathy, V. M. Patel, and R. Chellappa. Face-based active authentication
on mobile devices. In IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and
Signal Processing (ICASSP), 2015.
60
[9] P. Samangouei, V. M. Patel, and R. Chellappa. Attribute-based continuous user
authentication on mobile devices. In International Conference on Biometrics
Theory, Applications and Systems (BTAS), Arlington, VA, Sept 2015.
[10] Abdul Serwadda, Vir V. Phoha, and Zibo Wang. Which verifiers work?: A
benchmark evaluation of touch-based authentication algorithms. In BTAS,
pages 1–8. IEEE, 2013.
[11] M.O. Derawi, C. Nickel, P. Bours, and C. Busch. Unobtrusive user-
authentication on mobile phones using biometric gait recognition. In Intelligent
Inform. Hiding and Multimedia Signal Process. (IIH-MSP), 2010 6th Int. Conf.,
pages 306–311, Oct. 2010.
[12] A. Primo, V.V. Phoha, R. Kumar, and A. Serwadda. Context-aware active au-
thentication using smartphone accelerometer measurements. In Comput. Vision
and Pattern Recognition Workshops, IEEE Conf., pages 98–105, June 2014.
[13] D. Crouse, H. Han, D. Chandra, B. Barbello, and A. K. Jain. Continuous
authentication of mobile user: Fusion of face image and inertial measurement
unit data. In International Conference on Biometrics (ICB), May 2015.
[14] Heng Zhang, V.M. Patel, M. Fathy, and R. Chellappa. Touch gesture-based ac-
tive user authentication using dictionaries. In Applications of Computer Vision
(WACV), 2015 IEEE Winter Conference on, pages 207–214, Jan 2015.
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